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REQUIEM FOR A PIPEDREAM: OIL, THE WORLD BANK,
AND THE NEED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENTS
Dustin N. Sharp*
INTRODUCTION
The revenues associated with oil and other extractive industries projects in
sub-Saharan Africa—particularly as they are contrasted with the living
conditions of those for whom these revenues could provide the greatest
benefit—raise the hope of using natural resources to achieve significant
poverty alleviation. From the impoverished villages of the Niger Delta to south
Sudan, however, oil wealth has rarely led to widespread poverty alleviation.1
More often than not, the revenues that should in theory be a great boon to
development are in practice associated with disastrous human rights fallout as
living standards actually decrease and governance indicators worsen, a
phenomenon known as the “resource curse.”2
Because the resource curse transcends differences between otherwise
dissimilar oil exporting states, its effects and patterns are eminently predictable
when new oil is discovered in a poor country.3 However, whether those
foreseeable effects can actually be prevented or at least mitigated through
policy interventions is another question. In the late 1990s, the World Bank
Group (“World Banks” or “Bank”) served as the architect for a series of legal
and policy interventions intended to beat the resource curse by ensuring that
the newfound oil wealth of the central African state of Chad be channeled into
poverty alleviation efforts.4 The Chadian experiment in general, and its policy
intervention innovations in particular, were held up as models for other
extractive industries projects around the world.5
* Assistant Professor, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego. J.D., Harvard
Law School. Francophone West Africa Researcher, Human Rights Watch, 2006–2008.
1 See generally Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
(Harvard Inst. for Int’l Dev., Development Discussion Paper No. 517a, 1995) (discussing how the economies
of countries with abundant natural resources tend to have low growth rates).
2 See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in
Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 2 (2005).
3 See id. (indicating that the discovery of vast amounts of petroleum will have a negative effect on the
country).
4 See id. at 39–40.
5 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHAD: ESCAPING FROM THE OIL TRAP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 55 1 (2009).
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Ten years after entering the project in 2000, the World Bank has pulled out
of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, and its efforts to ensure that oil wealth
be translated into poverty reduction are considered to be a failure.6 The
resource curse, it would seem, has struck yet again. Notwithstanding the
predictable collapse of the project, the World Bank has suggested it will
continue its involvement in extractive industries initiatives in the future, taking
the “lessons” of the Chad experience with it.7 However, it is far from clear how
exactly it intends to operationalize the key lessons of the Chadian experience
in the future. Whether projects can be engineered to overcome the resource
curse is, it appears, still an open question.
This Article analyzes the various “lessons learned” that have been
articulated in the wake of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project’s collapse, and
argues that many of them miss the mark. Unless the World Bank develops a
more cohesive human rights policy with respect to lending decisions and
project implementation, the collapse of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project is
an experience that could well repeat itself in the future. A step toward better
human rights policy at the World Bank would involve conducting human rights
assessments for any potential project, much as the World Bank currently
undertakes social and environmental impact assessments.8 While human rights
assessments cannot prevent the resource curse, they would better steer the
World Bank and other development institutions towards those extractive
projects where the chances of mitigating the resource curse are the highest.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, this Article examines the
phenomenon of the “resource curse” as it has been developed in the literature
in terms of potential causes and effects. It pays particular attention to the
resource curse as it has played out in the context of oil extraction in subSaharan Africa. Older oil exporters appear to confirm patterns associated with
the resource curse, while newer ones raise serious and troubling questions.
This Article argues that the region is of increasingly vital importance to world
oil supplies, making the question of preventing or mitigating the resource curse
more pertinent than ever.

6

Id. at 16, 18.
Management Statement on the Lesson from Evaluation of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Development and
Pipeline Program, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 23, 2009), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22398488~menuPK:50003484~pagePK:2865066~
piPK:2865079~theSitePK:349862,00.html.
8 Alex Wilks, At Issue: World Bank Social and Environmental Policies: Abandoning Responsibility?,
BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Sept. 2003), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/env/safeguards.PDF.
7
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In Part II, this Article examines the case of one of sub-Saharan Africa’s
newer oil exporters, Chad, with a particular focus on the World Bank’s
attempts to beat the resource curse and ensure that newfound oil revenues be
used to fuel poverty alleviation. With the recent collapse of the World Bank’s
efforts in Chad, this Article places emphasis on dissecting the various lessons
learned that have been articulated, and analyzing the proposed modifications to
the policy interventions that have been implemented in the course of the ChadCameroon Pipeline project. Whatever lessons-learned narrative ultimately
carries forward will have great relevance to future extractive industries
initiatives across sub-Saharan Africa.
In Part III, this Article lays out the heart of its thesis, arguing that the
Bank’s continued ambivalence toward greater integration of human rights
principles into its assessment and programming is at least partially responsible
for the failure of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project. Going forward,
conducting human rights assessments would be one tool to force the Bank to
better grapple with factors that have ultimately doomed the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline project to failure, and for predicting where extractive industries
projects stand the best chance of being channeled into poverty alleviation.
I. OIL AND THE RESOURCE CURSE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
It has long been observed that countries heavily dependent on the export of
natural resources perform poorly when it comes to a wide range of social,
political, and economic indicators, and that this performance often lags behind
their less dependent counterparts.9 The negative relationship between
endowment with natural resources on the one hand and social and economic
development on the other is often referred to as the “resource curse” or
“paradox of plenty.”10
The resource curse is not a modern phenomenon, nor are its effects limited
to a particular region.11 Indeed, one of the most striking features of the
resource curse phenomenon is that countries that have little else in common
from an ethnic, geographic, cultural, or political standpoint seem to face a
common and counterintuitive dilemma: the natural resource wealth that should
9 See generally Sachs & Warner, supra note 1 (providing a groundbreaking study reviewing the history
of the phenomenon).
10 See Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 5–6. See also Michael Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource
Curse, 51 WORLD POL. 297, 300–05 (1999) (providing a review of the literature on the resource curse).
11 See Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 6 (noting examples throughout history of the resource curse).
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be a blessing does not bring with it social and economic development.12 While
the existence of the resource curse has been disputed,13 the empirical evidence
supporting the phenomenon appears to be strong.14
Though not limited to oil-exporting countries, petro-states provide a
particularly vivid illustration of the paradox of plenty. In theory, oil revenues
flowing into a desperately poor country should be able to provide a sorely
needed boost, bringing in investors and much needed capital.15 In practice, it is
often the case that oil not only fails to alleviate poverty, but actually tends to
worsen it.16 Between 1965 and 1998, for example, oil-exporting countries grew
more slowly than their non-oil-rich counterparts, experiencing an average
decrease in their per capita GNP of 1.3% per year, while their non-oil
counterparts grew by an average of 2.2% per year.17 Oil-exporting countries
tend to have higher levels of poverty, decreased spending on social sectors
such as health and education,18 and increased military spending.19
The resource curse is a global phenomenon, but there are reasons to be
especially concerned about its effects in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the thirty
lowest countries on the Human Development Index, only two are located
outside of sub-Saharan Africa.20 Over half of all sub-Saharan Africans
continue to live on less than one dollar per day.21 Given the endemic poverty,
12

Id. at 8.
See Graham Davis, Learning to Love the Dutch Disease: Evidence from Mineral Economies, 23
WORLD DEV. 1765, 1776 (1995) (arguing that the resource curse is not a widespread and general
phenomenon).
14 See Sachs & Warner, supra note 1 (analyzing ninety-seven countries over a nineteen-year period, and
concluding that states with a high ratio of natural resource exports had abnormally slow growth rates even
controlling for a wide range of variables); Terry Lynne Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and
Economic Consequences 7–10 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., and the Rule of Law, Stanford Univ., Working
Paper No. 80, 2007) (reviewing data indicating that oil exporting countries grow more slowly than their nonoil rich counterparts).
15 Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 8.
16 Karl, supra note 14, at 7.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 10–11.
19 Id. at 22.
20 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009 OVERCOMING BARRIERS:
HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT 173–74 (2009).
21 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009 5 (2009).
There continue to be concerns with using the dollar-per-day metric, particularly on the African continent,
based on a concern that it does not fully capture non-monetary income. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR. ET AL.,
ASSESSING PROGRESS IN AFRICA TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: MDG REPORT 2009 5 n.4
(2009). Nevertheless, the dollar-per-day metric “continues to be widely used to measure progress toward
poverty reduction.” Id.
13
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Africa is a continent that can scarcely afford to be made poorer by its own
wealth.
Literature analyzing the resource curse phenomenon illustrates a number of
other worrisome effects that sub-Saharan Africa can ill afford.22 Oil wealth
tends to negatively impact governance by reducing accountability, increasing
corruption, and strengthening authoritarianism.23 Why this should be so is the
subject of some debate, but the literature analyzing rentier states24 suggests
that governments that can rely on the bulk of their wealth from external
sources by exporting a commodity such as oil, with only a tiny minority
participating in generating the rent, are less reliant on—and therefore less
beholden to—the populations that they govern.25 With low taxes, citizens, in
turn, lose some of the incentive to demand accountability from their
government.26 At the same time, influxes of oil wealth provide strong incentive
for economic actors to bribe those who control access to the resources, and
some studies suggest that corruption is a driving force behind the resource
curse.27 Ultimately, because the source of governmental power becomes the
control of revenue flows from natural resources such as oil rather than taxes or
the ballot box, authoritarian regimes are strengthened, delaying or preventing
transitions to democracy that might otherwise be expected.28 One scholar
concludes that not only does oil thereby hurt democracy, “[it] does greater
damage to democracy in poor states than in rich ones.”29
While the potential negative effects on accountability and governance are
bad enough, there is also evidence to suggest that the probability of having
civil wars is higher in natural-resource-exporting countries than in their
resource-poor counterparts.30 Though its results have been questioned, one
22 See Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 2 (listing the litany of ills that befall those countries stricken with the
“resource curse”).
23 Id.
24 Rentier states are states that receive most of their revenues from external sources, often in the form of
natural resource rents. Ross, supra note 10, at 312.
25 Id. See also TERRY KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES 16 (1997)
(describing how extensive reliance on oil money leads to the weakening of the state’s ability to exercise
authority).
26 Ross, supra note 10, at 312.
27 See Nicholas Shaxson, Oil, Corruption, and the Resource Curse, 83 INT’L AFF. 1123, 1123, 1126
(2007). See also Carlos Leite & Jens Weidmann, Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources,
Corruption, and Economic Growth 29 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/85, 1999).
28 Jay Ulfelder, Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 995, 996
(2007).
29 Michael Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 356 (2001).
30 Id. at 328.
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study concluded that countries whose economy is substantially based on
primary commodities are “radically more at risk of conflict.”31 Additional
studies have continued to build evidence that the production of oil is
“associated with the onset of conflict, particularly separatist conflict.”32 Today,
at least one major international non-governmental organization (“NGO”),
Global Witness, has made an industry out of documenting the linkages
between the extraction of natural resources and conflict.33
One need not look too deeply into this history and politics of sub-Saharan
Africa’s older oil producers to see the troubling effects of the resource curse at
work. In East Africa, the southern region of Sudan was for decades the locus of
one of Africa’s most intractable civil wars, pitting the mostly black animist and
Christian South—the site of Sudan’s oil—against the largely Arab Muslim
dominated North.34 In the course of that brutal conflict, oil wealth fueled
abuses against civilians in the south.35 In West Africa, oil companies have
notoriously been complicit in human rights abuses in the Niger Delta, and the
oil-producing region has become synonymous with environmental catastrophe,
repression, and rebel movements.36 Despite dramatic increases in oil revenues
in recent decades, there has been scant improvement in Nigeria’s social and
economic conditions due in large part to rampant corruption.37 In southern
Africa, the Angolan government has famously used oil revenues to fund civil

31

PAUL COLLIER, ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CIVIL CONFLICT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 6
(2000). But see Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999, 48
AM. J. POL. SCI. 232 (2004) (“Oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime durability . . . .”). It
should be noted that regime durability and increased likelihood of conflict are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The fact that authoritarian regimes can use the proceeds from oil wealth to buy arms and sustain
themselves in power, coupled with the fact that the access to enormous resources that only comes with power
may tend to focus the minds of would-be rebel movements, may help to explain the different findings. The
case of Chad, discussed in detail in Part III of this Article, would appear to follow this pattern.
32 Michael Ross, What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?, 41 J. OF PEACE RES. 337,
342 (2004). See also Michael Ross, A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
265, 267 (2006); RICARDO SOARES DE OLIVERIA, OIL AND POLITICS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 37 (2007).
33 GLOBAL WITNESS, A CRUDE AWAKENING: THE ROLE OF THE OIL AND BANKING INDUSTRIES IN
ANGOLA’S CIVIL WAR AND THE PLUNDER OF STATE ASSETS 22 (1999).
34 See JOHN GHAZVINIAN, UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA’S OIL 280–81 (2007).
35 See Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: The Human Price of Oil, AI Index AFR 54/01/00ERR (May 2000); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (2003). It remains to be seen whether the anticipated
secession of South Sudan following a January 2011 referendum will result in better use of oil revenues.
36 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL-PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 9–12 (1999).
37 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHOP FINE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA 1 (2007). See also INT’L CRISIS GRP.,
NIGERIA: WANT IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY, AFRICA REPORT NO. 113 1 (2006).
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war efforts, and rampant corruption of oil revenues has guaranteed preciously
few gains in health and education.38
Against this backdrop, increasing oil prices and advances in technology in
the area of deep-water drilling mean that new oil producers, such as Ghana and
São Tomé and Príncipe, are coming online while others are likely to follow in
the years to come.39 African oil production is estimated “to rise by 91%
between 2002 and 2025, from 8.6 to 16.4 million barrels per day.”40 One
energy consulting firm has predicted that West Africa will be the number one
source outside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(“OPEC”) of the additional oil needed to meet the rise in world demand
between now and 2015.41 Taken together, increasing commodity prices and oil
scarcity have produced what some have called a twenty-first century “scramble
for Africa,”42 with the Chinese, Indians, and others emerging as major
competitors to the former colonial powers and the United States.43 Given the
endemic poverty in many sub-Saharan African states, the scramble makes the
question of the resource curse more pertinent and challenging than ever.
The resource curse is not destiny, and natural resources need not produce
disastrous results. The most famous counterexample from the African context
is that of Botswana, where diamond wealth has successfully been channeled
into economic development and poverty alleviation.44 Unfortunately, there are
precious few examples outside of Botswana of similarly successful efforts.
Botswana’s unique features, including a small and homogenous population,
may make it a model the rest of Africa will find difficult to follow.45
The hunt for solutions in more challenging country contexts—countries
with long histories of corruption, poor governance, human rights abuses, and
ethnic conflict—continues. The stakes are high. The most famous example yet
of an attempt to beat the resource curse in such a context is that of the Chad38 GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 33, at 2, 41–42; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME TRANSPARENCY, NO
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2004).
39 Daniel Morris, The Chance to Go Deep: U.S. Energy Interest in West Africa, AM. FOREIGN POL’Y
INTERESTS 225 (discussing drilling off the coast of Ghana).
40 Jedrzej George Frynas & Manuel Paulo, A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and
Business Perspectives, 106 AFR. AFF. 229, 240–41 (2007).
41 Morris, supra note 39, at 236.
42 Frynas & Paulo, supra note 40, at 230.
43 See generally id. (arguing for caution with the use of the term “new scramble”).
44 Maria Sarraf & Moortaza Jiwanji, Beating the Resource Curse: The Case of Botswana 9 (World Bank
Env’t Dep’t, Envtl. Econ. Series Paper No. 83, 2001).
45 Peter Rosenblum, Pipeline Politics in Chad, CURRENT HIST. 195, 198 (May 2000).
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Cameroon pipeline project. The successes and failures of that experiment are
of crucial relevance to oil-exporting countries across the continent, and will be
discussed in detail in the following section.
II. THE CHAD-CAMEROON PIPELINE PROJECT
A. The Political and Human Rights Context
Chad is a large country, roughly twice the size of France, with a population
of approximately 5.5 million people located just north of the African
continent’s center.46 Chad was the last French territory in Africa to be
occupied, developed, and given a civilian government.47 Until recently, it made
its post-colonial living off of cotton and foreign aid.48 Today, despite being one
of the world’s newest petro-states, it remains one of Africa’s poorest, worstgoverned, and most conflict-ridden countries, ranking 175 of 182 on the United
Nations Human Development Index,49 173 of 180 on Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index,50 and 46 of 48 on the Mo Ibrahim
Index of African Governance.51 Life expectancy is 47.7 years and 80% of the
population lives on less than one U.S. dollar a day.52
The impossible product of colonial border-drawing—cobbling together
Chad’s largely Muslim north and its largely Christian south—has produced a
political powder keg.53 Chad’s post-independence history has been regularly
punctuated by civil wars and coups d’état.54 Idriss Déby, Chad’s current
president, came to power in a putsch some twenty years ago.55 While enjoying
relative longevity, the regime has faced nearly twenty armed challenges to
46

See MARIO JOAQUIM AZEVEDO, ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: A HISTORY OF WAR IN CHAD 2 (1998).
See MARIO JOAQUIM AZEVEDO & EMMANUEL U. NNADOZIE, CHAD: A NATION IN SEARCH OF ITS
FUTURE 18 (1998).
48 Id. at 78–79, 84–85.
49 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009 OVERCOMING BARRIERS:
HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 20, at 145.
50 Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
51 ROBERT I. ROTBERG & RACHEL M. GISSELQUIST, STRENGTHENING AFRICAN GOVERNANCE: IBRAHIM
INDEX OF AFRICAN GOVERNANCE RESULTS AND RANKINGS 13 (2008).
52 CLAUDIA FRANK & LENA GUESNET, “WE WERE PROMISED DEVELOPMENT AND ALL WE GOT WAS
MISERY”—THE INFLUENCE OF PETROLEUM ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN CHAD 8 (2010).
53 See AZEVEDO & NNADOZIE, supra note 47, at 89–114.
54 See generally AZEVEDO, supra note 46, at 107–10. Since independence, Chad has spawned at least
thirty-three different rebel groups. CHRYSTANTUS AYANGAFAC, RESOLVING THE CHADIAN POLITICAL
EPILEPSY: AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERVENTION EFFORTS 5 (2009).
55 See AZEVEDO & NNADOZIE, supra note 47, at 62.
47
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date.56 Even when it does not produce open conflict, however, the north-south
cleavage simmers under the surface and is one of the most salient features of
Chadian politics.57 While southerners are well represented in the civil service
and dominate the press and local civil society, northerners have controlled the
government and military since 1982.58
Chad’s human rights record is among the worst in Africa. The reign of
Hissein Habré, Chad’s most notorious military leader who served as president
of Chad from 1982 to 1990, was marked by paranoia, clanism, severe political
repression, and torture.59
While no one is sure of the facts, the truth commission appointed
after Habré’s fall to investigate his crimes estimated that he is
responsible for the torture and death of 40,000 individuals . . . . most
died of torture and starvation in the prisons of Habré’s secret police,
60
the Directorate of Documentation and Security (“DDS”).

Although human rights conditions have undoubtedly improved since Déby
took power in 1990, severe human rights abuses have continued over the last
twenty years, including killings, torture, and arrests of real or perceived
opponents of the Déby regime and their communities.61 Today, Chad is ranked
among the world’s most repressive regimes.62
Though oil was discovered in the 1970s, civil war has several times
delayed further prospecting and exploitation.63 Given the history of conflict
and ethnic cleavages in Chad, it is important to note that the oil that has long
promised to deliver Chadians from poverty is located in the southern region of

56

See Han Van Dijk, Political Deadlock in Chad, 106 AFR. AFF. 697, 700 n.8 (2007).
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not to Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank’s
Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197, 215 (2001).
58 See id. at 215–16.
59 See Amnesty Int’l, Chad: The Habré Legacy, AI Index AFR 20/004/2001 (Oct. 2001). Habré,
currently living in exile in Senegal, has for the last decade been the subject of potential criminal prosecution by
Senegalese and other courts for crimes committed in Chad. See Dustin Sharp, Prosecutions, Development and
Justice: The Trial of Hissein Habré, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 147, 147–77 (2003) (discussing the genesis of
attempts to prosecute Habré).
60 Sharp, supra note 59, at 165–66.
61 Amnesty Int’l, Chad: A Country Under the Arbitrary Rule of the Security Forces with the Tacit
Consent of Other Countries, AI Index AFR 20/11/96 (Oct. 1996); Amnesty Int’l, Chad: Never Again? Killings
Continue into the 1990s, AI Index AFR 20/04/93 (Apr. 1993); Amnesty Int’l, Contracting out of Human
Rights: The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, AI Index AFR POL 34/12/2005 (Sept. 2005).
62 Press Release, Freedom House, Chad Joins Ranks of World’s Worst Regimes, Others Decline Further
(May 6, 2008), www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=653.
63 Rosenblum, supra note 45, at 197.
57
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Doba.64 In the 1990s, southern Chad was home to both a number of rebel
groups that threatened the central government and a population alienated from
the Déby regime.65 During this same period, a memorandum of understanding
was signed with an oil consortium for development of the Doba basin.66 Not
long thereafter, the government crushed the rebel insurgency using broad
counterinsurgency tactics, including measures targeting the civilian population,
with recorded massacres from 1992 to 1996.67 Some have argued that the
abuses perpetrated during this period were designed to eliminate any popular
southern resistance to the oil project.68 By the late 1990s, the rebellion had
been quelled, and the way was cleared for oil exploitation.69
B. The Pipeline Project
It is against this backdrop of political and ethnic schism, chronic instability,
dire economic poverty, and severe human rights abuses that the ChadCameroon pipeline moved forward in the late 1990s.70 Based on a partnership
between the Chadian government, a consortium of oil companies (including
Exxon, ChevronTexaco, and Petronas), and the World Bank, the pipeline
would take oil 1070 kilometers from the southern Doba region of landlocked
Chad to Cameroon’s Atlantic coast where it could be delivered to world
markets.71 The revenues generated by the pipeline seemed just the windfall
needed for a desperately poor country like Chad.
The risks of operating in such an environment were not lost on the
consortium of oil companies slated to develop the pipeline. Certainly the
political and geographic dynamics of oil extraction in Chad carried echoes of
neighboring Sudan, where the oil is located in a largely Christian South, while
the government was largely controlled by Muslims from the North.72 But it
was perhaps the internationally infamous oil development and public relations
disaster in Nigeria—with the 1995 hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other

64

Id.
See id.
66 Id.
67 Id. See generally Amnesty Int’l, Chad: A Country Under the Arbitrary Rule of the Security Forces
with the Tacit Consent of Other Countries, supra note 61 (discussing human rights violations in Chad during
the 1990s).
68 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 3–4.
69 See Rosenblum, supra note 45, at 197.
70 See id. at 197–98.
71 Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 38–39.
72 See GHAZVINIAN, supra note 34, at 280–81.
65
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activists—that most strongly focused world attention on the linkages between
oil extraction, corruption, and human rights abuses.73 Oil companies had
become the target of activist campaigns around the world, and they were eager
to avoid similar outcomes in Chad.74 If the oil companies recognized the risk
of a publicity disaster, the World Bank was “keenly aware of the ‘paradox of
plenty’ and the risks of the ‘resource curse’” and believed that without its
involvement there was a “very low probability that Chad’s people would
escape the oil curse.”75
Though its direct financial investment in the project was comparatively
insignificant, amounting to only three percent of the cost of the project,76 thus
began a marriage of convenience, with the World Bank and the oil companies
eager to use what leverage they had over the other to avoid distinct but related
outcomes.77 Perhaps most important from the oil companies’ perspective, the
Bank’s involvement promised to mitigate political risk, serving as a buffer
between a potentially resentful population and international activism on the
one hand and oil companies on the other.78 If Chad were to become another
“Ogoniland,” the oil companies would not be the only ones found morally
culpable.79 At the same time, the Bank was also to serve as “moral guarantor,”
transforming a commercial project into a development project that would
alleviate poverty and mitigate the risk of the resource curse.80

73 See Amos Adeoye Idowu, Human Rights, Environmental Degradation and Oil Multinational
Companies in Nigeria: The Ogoniland Episode, 17 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 161, 177–80 (1999); Scott Pegg, Can
Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 105 AFR.
AFF. 1, 22 (2005).
74 See, e.g., Duruigbo, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the addition of the World Bank as insulation from
criticisms).
75 INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., THE WORLD BANK GROUP PROGRAM OF SUPPORT FOR THE CHADCAMEROON PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
REPORT 9–10 (2009) [hereinafter INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT].
76 Id. at 71.
77 See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 25.
78 Id.
79 See id. (discussing how the oil companies are no longer the only parties responsible).
80 See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Group Approves Support for Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
Development and Pipeline Projects (June 6, 2000), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/CHADEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20058876~menuPK:64282138~page
PK:41367~piPK:279616~theSitePK:349862,00.html. When the World Bank Board of Directors approved the
project in 2000, the World Bank boasted that the project was “an unprecedented framework to transform oil
wealth into direct benefits for the poor, the vulnerable and the environment.” Id.
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C. Legal and Policy Interventions
Projected to cost $3.7 billion, the pipeline constitutes the single largest
private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa.81 The project has become
known not for its scale, technical difficulty, or the size of Chad’s oil reserves,
however, but for a series of legal and policy interventions pushed by the World
Bank in order to try to mitigate the resource curse by ensuring that Chad
actually used the oil revenues for poverty alleviation.82 These strategies
roughly fell into two basic categories.83 First, a trust fund and revenue
allocation scheme whereby the bulk of revenues would be allocated to priority
development sectors such as health and education.84 Second, a series of
transparency monitoring and oversight bodies, both domestic and international,
intended to follow project implementation and revenue.85 Both categories are
provided for under Chad’s Revenue Management Law, adopted by Chad’s
National Assembly under World Bank pressure in 1998.86
Under the Revenue Management Law as originally adopted, Chad’s oil
revenues are to flow though audited, offshore escrow accounts, and to be
overseen by a national monitoring body, the Collège de Contrôle et de
Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières (“Collège”).87 The law further
provided for the allocation of direct oil revenues, with 10% to go to a “Future
Generations Fund.”88 Of the remainder, 5% is to be earmarked for the oilproducing region in southern Chad, 80% for poverty reduction spending,
including education, health care, and social services, and the remaining 15%
for general government expenditures.89
Beyond the Revenue Management Law, further oversight arising out of
loan conditionalities was provided for by the International Advisory Group

81

FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 25. By 2008, investment costs had reached $6.5 billion. Id. at 25

n.31.
82

Id. at 25.
The details of Chad’s revenue management and oversight mechanisms have been covered in great
detail elsewhere. See, e.g., IAN GARY & NIKKI REISCH, CHAD’S OIL: MIRACLE OR MIRAGE? FOLLOWING THE
MONEY IN AFRICA’S NEWEST PETRO-STATE (2005); Uriz, supra note 57.
84 See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 26–27.
85 See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 51.
86 Loi n°001/PR/99 du 11 janvier 1999 de gestion des revenus pétroliers [Law No. 001/PR/99 of January
11, 1999 on the Petroleum Revenue Management], Jan. 11, 1999 [hereinafter Revenue Management Law]
(Chad). See also GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 42.
87 See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 51, 86.
88 Id. at 99 (quoting Article 9 of Chad’s Revenue Management Law).
89 Id. at 42.
83
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(“IAG”), an international monitoring body established to advise the World
Bank on the adequacy of implementation.90 Taken together, the various
provisions for oversight and allocation of oil revenues were the most elaborate
attempt yet to beat the resource curse through policy intervention, and to
engineer good governance and transparency into a project environment noted
for a lack thereof.91
Critics have long pointed to serious flaws in the project’s revenue
management and oversight mechanisms, beginning with gaps and imprecision
in the law itself.92 For example, with respect to the five percent of revenues to
be allocated to the oil-producing region, the law does not define the “oil
region”; it can be changed by unilateral presidential decree.93 In addition, the
provisions dealing with the priority social sectors to which revenues must be
devoted under the law are vague, and no particular distribution among them is
required, potentially inviting abuse.94
Perhaps a larger issue, however, is that the way that the law is written puts
a significant portion of the oil revenues outside its allocation and oversight
mechanisms. The law distinguishes between direct (dividend and royalties) and
indirect (taxes, charges, and customs duties) revenues.95 Only direct revenues
are placed into the audited escrow account and subjected to the various
allocation requirements of the Revenue Management Law.96 Furthermore, the
law applies only to oil extracted from the three original oil fields in the Doba
region of southern Chad, not to any new production areas.97 While the exact
numbers are difficult to determine, today it appears that less than half of
Chad’s oil wealth is actually covered by the Revenue Management Law.98

90

Id. at 13.
Pegg, supra note 73, at 2.
92 See Uriz, supra note 57, at 224. For example, a legal study conducted by the Harvard Law School
Clinical Program in 1999 pointed out serious gaps in the law’s coverage. Id. at 224 n.212 (citing Managing Oil
Revenues in Chad: Legal Deficiencies and Institutional Weaknesses (Oct. 1999) (unpublished briefing paper)).
93 See Revenue Management Law, supra note 86, art. 8; Uriz, supra note 57, at 223.
94 See Uriz, supra note 57, at 223.
95 See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 98 (quoting Article 2 of Revenue Management Law).
96 See id.
97 Several new oil fields have been discovered beyond the original Doba fields, and a number of
prospecting studies have identified other new oil basins, suggesting that Chad’s reserves may be significantly
higher than originally estimated. See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 93.
98 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 9 (estimating that indirect revenues account for sixty percent of
Chad’s total annual oil income).
91
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With respect to oversight mechanisms, the power of the committee (the
Collège) created under the law to authorize and monitor disbursements has
been inversely proportional to its willingness to do its job.99 While early critics
feared that the committee would be packed with Déby loyalists,100 in practice,
the committee’s reports have been of surprising quality despite problematic
staffing.101 However, because the committee has lacked the power to compel
compliance with its recommendations and has no independent revenue stream,
it has been left to the mercy of government funding cuts, and there has been
limited to no follow up on its warnings and recommendations.102 In effect, one
might argue that it has been little more effective than civil society groups in
that its power was largely limited to publishing reports.103
D. A Chronicle of Failure
Even before the project’s revenue management and oversight mechanisms
were implemented, there were signs that the highest priority of the Chadian
government was not translating oil wealth into development opportunity.
Notoriously, in 2000, the Chadian government spent $4.5 million of the $25
million signing bonus paid by the oil consortium on the purchase of arms,104 an
act that violated the spirit if not the letter of the Revenue Management Law. In
response, the Bank protested and threatened to freeze Chad’s debt relief
program, but ultimately did nothing.105
This inauspicious incident established a pattern that would continue until
the World Bank’s eventual pullout from the project in 2008, with the Chadian
government pushing for greater autonomy and discretion over oil revenues and
the Bank protesting before relenting.106 While the “consistent ability of African
leaders to outmanoeuvre external pressures for reform”107 may not have been a
lesson the World Bank has drawn from the literature, the Chadian government
99 KORINA HORTA, SAMUEL NGUIFFO & DELPHINE DJIRAIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, THE CHADCAMEROON OIL & PIPELINE PROJECT: A PROJECT NON-COMPLETION REPORT 12 (2007).
100 See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 50 (discussing government interference as being a common
occurrence).
101 See id.
102 HORTA ET AL., supra note 99, at 12.
103 See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 51 (describing the Collège as a “toothless tiger”).
104 Uriz, supra note 57, at 225.
105 See id. (citing Babette Stern, Le Tchad a Acheté des Armes avec l’Argent du Pétrol, LE MONDE, Nov.
22, 2000, at 5).
106 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 1, 16.
107 Scott Pegg, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 108
AFR. AFF. 311, 312 (2009).
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quickly grew frustrated with the terms of the agreement and recognized its
growing ability to alter those terms.108 With sunk costs and the oil flowing, it
had long been recognized that the World Bank’s leverage over the Chadian
government would decrease with time, a phenomenon also predicted by the
obsolescing bargaining theory.109
The structural dynamics of the World Bank’s partnership with the
government of Chad were exacerbated by rising military and human insecurity
that began not long after the oil started to flow because of the Darfur conflict
spilling over the border and a host of Chadian rebel groups beginning to gain
momentum.110 Confronting “several coup attempts, large-scale defections from
the army, and an empty treasury,” the regime was desperate for additional oil
money.111
These dynamics came to a head in late 2005 when the Chadian government
demanded a larger share of revenues earmarked for development and poverty
alleviation, bringing about a confrontation with the World Bank. After tough
negotiations involving no small measure of brinksmanship—Déby at one point
threatened to cut off all oil supplies112—the World Bank relented and Chad
revised the percentage of direct oil revenues earmarked for priority
development sectors from 80% to 70%, eliminating the Future Generations
Fund.113 On the heels of its victory, the Déby regime would continue to
consolidate its unchecked autonomy over oil revenues without great concern
for a renewed memorandum of understanding with the World Bank,
completely overhauling the committee membership and replacing the
representatives with more compliant colleagues.114
By 2008, the World Bank’s position had become untenable. The idea that
the Bank could continue to serve as “moral guarantor” and use its involvement
as a means of ensuring that the project achieved poverty alleviation objectives
could not be sustained. When the Chadian government pre-paid all outstanding
pipeline loans ($65.7 million), the World Bank’s involvement in Chad’s oil
108

Id. at 313.
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xvi. “[T]he strong assertions of ownership and
commitment of the Government of Chad at the start of the program proved inoperative when the oil revenue
started flowing.” Id.
110 See generally JEROME TUBIANA, THE CHAD-SUDAN PROXY WAR AND THE “DARFURIZATION” OF
CHAD: MYTHS AND REALITY (2008) (providing background and context to the recent conflict in Chad).
111 Van Dijk, supra note 56, at 697 (citations omitted).
112 HORTA ET AL., supra note 99, at 12.
113 Van Dijk, supra note 56, at 698–99.
114 INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 8.
109

SHARP GALLEYSFINAL

394

6/15/2011 8:51 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

sector came to a close.115 One of the world’s foremost experiments in trying to
beat the resource curse had effectively ended.116
E. The Return of the Resource Curse?
According to a World Bank post-mortem review of the project, the oil
boom has brought precious little development to Chad thus far.117 Some key
health indicators show that human development has stagnated or deteriorated
since 2000.118 While Africa as a whole showed a slight improvement between
2000 and 2007, “Chad experienced a marked deterioration against all major
governance indicators—with the decline especially sharp in rule of law, control
of corruption, and government effectiveness.”119 These declining indicators are
largely consistent with the patterns observed in other oil-producing states and
the correlative phenomena of the resource curse, as discussed above in
Part I.120
The image of stagnation and decline stands in sharp contrast with Chad’s
oil revenues, which have greatly exceeded initial expectations due to a rise in
world oil prices.121 The failure to improve is especially striking when one
considers the change in governmental capacity to deliver on the promises of
development, having gone from annual revenue of about $112 million in 2000
to over $2 billion in 2009, almost 90% of which was from oil.122 At the same
time, between 2000 and 2009, annual military expenditure rose from $14
million to $315 million.
As noted herein, the resource curse literature also suggests a higher
likelihood of civil war and conflict in petro-states than their non-oil-exporting
counterparts.123 While it would be difficult to attribute the recent conflict in
Chad to oil alone, “the existence of the oil exercises the minds of actors both

115

Lydia Polgreen, World Bank Ends Efforts to Help Chad Ease Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at

A12.
116 Press Release, The World Bank Group, World Bank Statement on Chad-Cameroon Pipeline (Sept. 9,
2008), http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01210/web/0_co-20.htm.
117 See INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at v (discussing how fundamental objectives of
the project were not achieved).
118 Id. at 22.
119 Id. at xiii.
120 See supra Part I.
121 INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xii.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., TUBIANA, supra note 110, at 10.
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internal and external,”124 and the violence in eastern Chad has its roots, at least
in part, in “the Chadian people’s widespread frustration with the country’s
unequal wealth distribution—particularly its oil wealth—and lack of
democracy.”125 Confronted with simmering frustration from all sides, “[it] is
doubtful that Déby would still be in power had it not been for revenues from
the exportation of crude oil.”126 The overall image is that of a vicious circle in
which a non-democratic government justifies the need for a crescendo of
military spending on the threat of rebel attack, which is itself fueled in part by
frustration with corruption and a desire to access patronage networks
associated with the oil revenues. Oil wealth has thereby changed and
contributed to the dynamics of conflicts over access to power “which have
prevailed in Chad since independence, and are still ongoing.”127
F. Analyzing the Analysis of Failure
The Chad-Cameroon pipeline was once trumpeted as a model to be
emulated in other extractive industries projects around the world.128 After its
spectacular—if not predictable—collapse, the World Bank has nevertheless
refused to exclude involvement in future extractive projects.129 There is still
some hope, at least in the minds of some policymakers, that policy intervention
can beat the resource curse in the future.130 In these circumstances, the lessonslearned narrative that ultimately carries forward will have great relevance to
subsequent extractive industries projects. Could the models pioneered in the
context of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline be revised and recycled in other
contexts? Was the problem too much policy intervention, or too little? Was the
problem one of design, or of implementation?
One of the major recognized flaws in project implementation is the fact that
the project proceeded at two speeds.131 While the exploration, construction,
and production phases of the project proceeded well ahead of schedule, with
the first oil leaving for international markets one year ahead of schedule,
efforts to build the capacity of the Chadian government to manage oil revenues

124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Simon Massey & Roy May, Commentary: The Crisis in Chad, 105 AFR. AFF. 443, 446 (2006).
TUBIANA, supra note 110, at 10.
Van Dijk, supra note 56, at 698. See also INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 1.
See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 64.
See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 8 (describing the high hopes for the project).
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xx.
Id. at 47.
See GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 80–81.
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ran woefully behind schedule.132 The effect of the two-speed pace of
implementation privileged exports and revenue generation over institution
building, and oil money over human development.133 This has led at least one
commentator to conclude that future projects should focus on “front-loading”
the capacity-building phase of project implementation, and only proceed to oil
production once a certain minimum threshold of capacity has been reached.134
This argument has particular cogency given the dynamics of obsolescing
bargaining theory.135 As was amply demonstrated in Chad, once the oil begins
to flow, the leverage of international development institutions like the World
Bank decreases dramatically, and with it, their ability to press for increases in
revenue management expertise and other capacity building initiatives.136 At the
same time, in an increasingly competitive oil market, with China and India
emerging as serious players in African markets,137 it seems doubtful that a
country would be willing to leave the oil in the ground until the World Bank
has deemed them capable of managing the revenues.138 As the World Bank has
recently argued, a deal will be struck eventually with a group of oil companies
less concerned about social impacts and negative publicity than the Exxon
consortium was in Chad in the late 1990s.139 This may be particularly true in
the least stable and most conflict-prone countries since oil revenues in these
volatile circumstances can mean the difference between a regime’s survival or
toppling in a coup d’état.140 In that sense, one might argue that policy
interventions of the nature seen in the context of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline
are most likely to work only in those countries where they are least needed.141
Therefore, perhaps the best that can be hoped is that capacity-building and
preparations for extraction proceed concurrently, and that the latter do not
largely outpace the former.
To focus on the modalities and sequencing of capacity-building initiatives,
however, would seem to miss a larger point. The World Bank experiment in

132

Id. at 81.
Pegg, supra note 73, at 20.
134 Pegg, supra note 107, at 319.
135 Id. at 313.
136 Id.
137 See Massey & May, supra note 124, at 447.
138 See Pegg, supra note 107, at 317.
139 INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xiv.
140 See Van Dijk, supra note 56, at 698 (using Déby’s survival as a leader in Chad as an example).
141 See generally FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52 (describing the pipeline’s devastating impact on the
already unstable environment in Chad).
133
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Chad did not fail simply because of a lack of trained national staff unable to
make sense of the revenues or to adequately account for them.142 If
inadequacies existed there, even several years of additional capacity-building
efforts prior to production coming online likely would not have made a
difference if the government was otherwise intent on resisting externally
imposed reforms and had not prioritized the goal of translating oil wealth into
development opportunity for the people of Chad.143
Beyond issues of capacity-building and sequencing, many have pointed to
flaws in the project’s oversight and monitoring structures, including the
Collège’s lack of enforcement powers and independent budget, as discussed
above.144 However, even if these issues were rectified, there is strong reason to
wonder if the failure of the pipeline project does not illustrate the limits of
transparency. According to the World Bank, the revenue management
arrangements implemented in Chad “achiev[ed] a level of revenue
transparency nearly unique in Africa and nearing best international
practice.”145 Indeed, few would argue that the project failed because of a lack
of awareness about what was going on.146 Thus, while initiatives focusing on
increasing transparency in the extractive industries sector—including the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”)147 and the Publish What
You Pay (“PWYP”) campaign148—are important, they are no panacea.
Moving beyond project implementation to project conception and design,
in its own internal review of the project’s failure, the World Bank has
suggested that the “excessive rigidity” resulting from “the enshrinement of
quantitative spending targets into formal law” may have contributed to the
project’s demise.149 While many doubt that legal formalism is an absolute
prerequisite for building the rule of law and economic development,150
flexibility and informality is equally tricky business in a country like Chad.
Chad’s volatility has been amply illustrated by recent history, which might
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 52.
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xx.
See supra notes 92–103 and accompanying text.
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at 25.
See id.
See FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 68 (describing the EITI); GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at

7–8.
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GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 7 (describing the PWYP).
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at 37.
150 See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J.
OF INT’L L. 809 (2005); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy 1 (Carnegie Endowment for
Int’l Peace, Paper No. 30, 2002).
149
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seem to underscore the need for flexibility in project design.151 At the same
time, if flexibility is to function in harmony with larger development
objectives, genuine government commitment to the goals of the project must
be clear.152 When poor governance indicators and a history of episodic armed
challenges to the survival of the state are the norm, building a high degree of
flexibility into a project could well increase the risk that a government will
ultimately privilege spending for hard security over development priorities like
health and education.153 On the other hand, rigid program design in such an
environment is almost guaranteed to produce confrontation with international
partners and backlash.154
G. The Question of Government Commitment
Many of the “lessons learned” discussed above skirt around the central
problem of political will and government commitment to the core goals of the
project.155 Few would question that, without government commitment, no
alternative program or package of policy measures is likely to succeed.156 And
yet, in a context such as Chad, the unspoken premise of legal and policy
interventions such the Revenue Management Law is that the government in
question is not entirely committed to translating oil revenues into
development.157 Such measures are therefore imbued with latent tension and
paradox from the start.
In this context of questionable political commitment, the notion of
externally designed and imposed legal and policy interventions is especially
problematic. The Revenue Management Law, lauded as the one of the project’s
boldest innovations, was “in effect designed largely by Bank staff and
consultants.”158 Some have criticized similar legal transplants as a form of neoimperialism and suggested that they may have limited success in building rule
of law due to cultural differences.159 Others have noted that borrowing legal
151

See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 5, at 1.
See Upham, supra note 150, at 19.
153 See, e.g., Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1834 (2002).
154 See generally id. (analyzing the dangers of rigidity in human rights enforcement in a different context).
155 See supra notes 131–54 and accompanying text.
156 INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at xx.
157 Id. at xix.
158 Id. at 42.
159 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the “Rule of Law,” 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2275, 2280 (2004) (“In an increasing number of places, promoting the rule of law has become a
fundamentally imperialist enterprise, in which foreign administrators backed by large armies govern societies
152
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rules or institutions from other countries may be the main source of legal
change throughout the world.160 Nevertheless, whether a law was imposed
from the outside as opposed to being pushed and adopted by local champions
makes a difference in a context like Chad. Finally, whether the Revenue
Management Law was internally or externally driven, Chad’s track record of
less than rigorous adherence to its own laws would suggest that any faith in the
idea of a technocratic legal solution to Chad’s governance issues is illfounded.161
The Revenue Management Law is, in effect, an attempt to bootstrap or
engineer good governance from the outside into a context where it is
lacking.162 Such measures are fraught with paradox in that that they are likely
to work best in those countries that need them least.163 At the core of such
measures is a challenge to the notion of national autonomy over natural
resources and, more particularly, “a challenge to the sovereignty of
undemocratic rulers.”164 As the case of Chad vividly illustrates, undemocratic
rulers will often find a way to outmaneuver the international community,
especially when their grip on power, if not their very survival, is at stake.165
Assessing government commitment to any package of reforms in this context
is therefore challenging but paramount.
H. Moving Forward
While the World Bank now acknowledges that government commitment is
key to success,166 there are reasons to be less than sanguine about prospects for
that have been pronounced unready to take on the task of governing themselves.”) (citation omitted).
According to some accounts, law and development projects of the 1950s and 1960s often consisted of nothing
more than the wholesale transplantation of Western legal codes. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
160 Upham, supra note 150, at 33.
161 As one local civil society activist put it, “[i]f laws could make a difference in this country, we would
already be well advanced. But the problem lies in implementation.” FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 29.
162 Id. at 26.
163 See generally id. at 28–29.
164 Rosenblum, supra note 45, at 195. In 2009, the director of Chad’s newly created national oil company
lamented, “We are the only country in the world which cannot do what it wants with the resources generated
from its primary commodities.” Cheikh Yérim Seck, Où va l’argent du pétrol, JEUNE AFRIQUE (Jan. 6, 2009,
5:12 PM), http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAJA2525p038-040.xml0/.
165 Indeed, the ability of local elites to outwit and outmaneuver foreign interveners to their own survival
and gain has been a feature of African politics since colonial times. See WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE
MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE
GOOD 276 (2007).
166 INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at v, xx.
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success in future extractives projects. Even if the World Bank is aware of a
possible lack of government commitment in a given context, the Bank has
historically greatly overestimated its ability to build capacity for a project and
to “transpose good governance and sound economic policies as intervening
variables in countries with no prior history of them.”167 In the context of Chad,
a Bank review recently concluded that it “was right to support the program in
2000 and did so in full cognizance of the risks involved,” including the risk of
the lack of political commitment.168 Despite this awareness, the Bank moved
forward with the project with the (over)confidence that the risk could be
managed.169 There is no reason to think that it will not act similarly in future
circumstances.
In addition, while the World Bank has stated that it will place greater
emphasis on ensuring country ownership in the future, it has failed to explain
how such ownership might be better assessed ex ante much less ensured ex
post.170 In its post-mortem analysis of the Chad project’s collapse, the World
Bank concludes:
The question arises whether the [World Bank] could have demanded
at the beginning a sufficiently robust test of government’s ownership
to use the oil resources as agreed . . . . It is hard to see what else the
Bank could have done to increase its degree of ex ante comfort with
government ownership. The only real test would come, as it did,
171
when the oil revenues begin to flow.

Given the centrality of government commitment to a project’s success, a key
question going forward is therefore whether the Bank is correct in its assertion
that there are no better metrics that it can rely on to assess commitment than
strenuous and repeated public assurances by high-level government officials.172
This Article argues below that the Bank could achieve this objective by
developing a more coherent human rights policy, and by conducting human
rights assessments that would help to measure whether the enabling conditions
for project success are in place.

167
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172

Pegg, supra note 73, at 20; see also GARY & REISCH, supra note 83, at 80–82.
INDEP. EVALUATION GRP. REPORT, supra note 75, at viii.
Id.
Id. at xxi.
Id. at 42–43.
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III. THE NEED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENTS IN EXTRACTIVES PROJECTS
It is amazing to what extent in most countries the entire official aid
rhetoric and all the written documents tiptoe around the key human
rights challenges, preferring silence, insinuation, self-censorship, and
gentle neologism to any frank mention of the stakes, the problems,
173
and the unfulfilled challenges.

Though there is increasing recognition that extractive projects and
development assistance can create devastating human rights impacts under
certain conditions, the World Bank has no overarching human rights policy or
process that would serve to assess these impacts, guide lending decisions, or
mitigate impacts during project implementation.174 This stands in contrast to
existing policies to address issues of cultural property, environmental
assessment, forests, indigenous peoples, and involuntary displacement, some
of which include human rights related issues.175
In explaining this lacuna, many scholars, policymakers, and advocates
focus on restrictions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, or founding
constitution.176 Under Article IV, Section 10, interference in “political affairs”
is prohibited and only “economic considerations” are to be used in decisionmaking.177 Article III, Section 5(B) excludes “political considerations” from
the factors the Bank may consider in granting loans.178
Historically, these provisions have served as a stumbling block to a more
explicit engagement with human rights, particularly civil and political rights,
which have been interpreted as “political considerations.”179 In contrast, the
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PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 81 (2004).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 32–33.
175 OPERATIONS MANUAL: TABLE A1–ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARD POLICIES—POLICY
OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES, WORLD BANK (2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
YFA8D3WJS0.
176 INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., IBRD ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (1989) [hereinafter
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT], available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
0,,contentMDK:20049557~menuPK:63000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708,00.html.
177 Id. art. IV, § 10.
178 Id. arts. III, § 5, IV. The original separation between economics and politics may have arisen out of a
political calculation of what was necessary to facilitate Soviet acquiescence to Bretton Woods Institutions.
Henry J. Bittermann, Negotiation of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, 5 INT’L LAW. 59, 79 (1971).
179 Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights
at the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 647, 659 (2009).
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Bank has been more open to economic and social rights, which have been seen
as non-political development issues.180
In practice, the political-economic distinction has been approached with
some flexibility because it is recognized that non-economic issues often have
economic consequences or implications.181 Thus, interpretation of the Bank’s
Articles has shifted over time, allowing for involvement in areas, such as legal
reform and anticorruption efforts, which were formerly deemed too political.182
Similarly, in examining factors that can affect its investments, the Bank
analyzes a country’s policy and institutional framework.183 Nevertheless, many
human rights issues are still deemed too political for the Bank to address
directly.184 Some have argued this results in selective and self-serving
interpretation of the Articles, with the Bank seemingly interpreting its mandate
narrowly when it comes to some governance and human rights issues, while
ignoring limitations on involvement in political affairs when it comes to neoliberal economic policies prescribed through loan conditionalities for
developing countries.185
Despite the controversy, as an opinion from the World Bank’s outgoing
legal counsel has confirmed, nothing on the face of the Articles of Agreement
prohibits more direct engagement in a fuller range of human rights
considerations; indeed, there is a strong legal argument that the Bank should
engage in such considerations.186 Therefore, the debate over interpretation of
the Articles of Agreement is more of a policy argument disguised as a legal
argument than an absolute legal roadblock.
While the interpretation of the Articles of Agreement continues to be “a
locus of contention among Bank staff, advocates, and policymakers,”187 it has

180

See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the
Record of Achievements, 17 DEN. J. INT’L & POL’Y 39, 47 (1988); see also Korinna Horta, Rhetoric and
Reality: Human Rights and the World Bank, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 227, 228 (2002) (questioning the Bank’s
distinction between civil and political rights, and economic and social rights).
181 See Horta, supra note 180, at 229.
182 Sarfaty, supra note 179, at 659.
183 Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, The World Bank,
Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the World Bank 5 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ifiwatchnet.
org/?q=en/node/335.
184 Sarfaty, supra note 179, at 659.
185 Uriz, supra note 57, at 208.
186 Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, supra note 183. Issued his last day in office, this opinion has had
limited impact on the Bank’s official policy. See Sarfaty, supra note 179, at 663–66.
187 Sarfaty, supra note 179, at 688.
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also been argued that the ambivalence toward a fuller and more direct
engagement with human rights issues is more a feature of institutional culture
than legal proscription.188 Developing a more comprehensive and cohesive
human rights policy at the Bank may therefore depend more on building
consensus around the idea that human rights are important as a matter of
fundamental economic and project design policy than any argument based on
their intrinsic deontological value or legal force.189
A. The Argument for Human Rights Assessments
Whether caused by disputes over legal interpretation or institutional
culture, the World Bank’s continuing ambivalence towards human rights issues
is not without its real-world costs. In the case of Chad, a more direct and
coherent approach to human rights issues up front may have forced the Bank to
better grapple with factors that ultimately doomed the pipeline project to
failure, and may have served as a better way to measure political commitment
than those currently employed by the Bank.190 There are reasons to fear that if
the Bank fails to develop a more coherent approach to human rights, other
projects will similarly fail in the future.191 One step toward better human rights
policy at the Bank would involve conducting human rights assessments for any
potential project, much as the Bank currently undertakes in social and
environmental impact assessments.192
Conducting human rights assessments in the context of an extractive
industries project would serve three goals. First, it would allow the World
Bank to predict and mitigate immediate to medium-term human rights impacts
of the project. Second, in examining potential human rights impacts, the
assessment would serve to predict a set of risks that may affect the economic
bottom line and the long-term viability of the project. Third, and perhaps most
relevant to the World Bank’s core mission, the assessment would serve as a
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See id. at 647.
It is worth noting in this regard that other development institutions involved in poverty reduction have
adopted formal human rights policies, including the United Nations Development Programme, The United
Nations Children’s Fund, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. See generally
TAM O’NEIL, MARTA FORESTI, TIM BRAUNHOLTZ & BHAVNA SHARMA, DFID’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
SCOPING STUDY (2007); UNICEF, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN: HOW UNICEF MAKES THEM
A REALITY (1999); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS WITH SUSTAINABLE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: A UNDP POLICY DOCUMENT (1998).
190 See, e.g., Sarfaty, supra note 179, at 679–80.
191 See id.
192 Id. at 669, 680.
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proxy to assess the likelihood of the project itself contributing to poverty
reduction in the long-term, including the question of political commitment.
The purpose of project assessments, be they environmental or social-impact
assessments, is to determine a set of harms that might follow in the direct or
indirect wake of project activities.193 A human rights assessment would require
the World Bank to assess, monitor, and mitigate those immediate human rights
impacts that might be associated with an extractive industries project, whether
they come in the form of displacement or political repression.194 Some of these
impacts—displacement, for example—might be captured by existing
assessments that are already carried out under World Bank policy, but others
would not.195 In conducting an assessment, the World Bank would look at both
civil and political rights impacts, as well as social and economic rights
impacts.196 The latter would include immediate impacts on social and
economic rights such as clean drinking water and health care.197 Thus, since it
casts a wider net than existing impact assessments, the addition of a human
rights assessment in and of itself would go a long way to more fully capturing
the immediate to medium-term impacts of a project.
As discussed above, there are strong humanitarian reasons to attempt to
capture a fuller range of impacts that may flow from a given project relating to
a desire to reduce the amount of human suffering and harm that will result.198
At the same time, there are also pragmatic reasons to conduct human rights
assessments relating to the bottom line. In the business world, one would
expect a corporation to rely upon an analysis of all of the factors that might
affect its investment and other activities, be they social, environmental,
political, or otherwise.199 Thus, one of the main business motivations to
include human rights analysis in advance of a project would be to accurately

193 See Tarek Maassarani, Margo Drakos & Joanna Pajkowska, Extracting Corporate Responsibility:
Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 135, 144–45 (2007) (describing the use
of project assessments for private corporate actors).
194 See id. at 157–58 (proposing the International Financial Corporation Equator Principles, which would
guide the adoption of a Human Rights Impact Statement).
195 Id. at 157. According to Danino, resettlement issues are considered political. Legal Opinion from
Roberty Danino, supra note 183, at 7.
196 See id.
197 See Shihata, supra note 180, at 55–56.
198 See supra notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
199 See Maassarani, Drakos & Pajkowska, supra note 193, at 149–50 (listing the “guiding principles” for
evaluating corporate impacts on human rights).
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predict the business risks related to human rights.200 As has been noted, “longterm revenue considerations require an analysis of the human risks that may
burn slowly for years, ultimately exploding years later in disaster, severe
losses, and bad publicity.”201 Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the
chaos in the Niger Delta, one of the situations that likely led the oil consortium
in Chad to seek political risk mitigation from the World Bank.202 If a
corporation were to ignore the full sets of risks to the bottom line, it might be
labeled bad business.203 When the World Bank fails to do so, however, it is
called standard procedure.204
In addition to helping the Bank foresee and mitigate more immediate
human harms and providing a better picture of the economic and business
risks, human rights assessments could also serve as proxy for the likelihood of
the project itself contributing to long-term poverty reduction. Under
international law, social and economic rights—the right to health and
education, for example—are not absolute, but require a government to
“progressively realize” them based on available resources.205 Therefore,
analysis of the economic and social rights impacts of a project would
necessarily include analyzing the project’s potential impact on the
government’s ability to progressively realize economic and social rights over
the long-term.206
At its most crude, such an assessment might conclude that because the duty
of progressive realization is connected to the availability of resources, and
because the project in question will increase revenues flowing into government
coffers, it follows that the project will have a positive impact on the
government’s ability to “progressively realize” economic and social rights.207

200 Id. at 159 (discussing the risks inherent in being perceived as a bad corporate citizen); id. at 167
(“[E]mbracing and addressing human rights issues related to their operations is a matter of maintaining a
sound reputation and exercising sound business judgment.”).
201 Id. at 167.
202 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 36, at 10–11.
203 See Maassarani, Drakos & Pajkowska, supra note 193, at 136 (describing the current patchwork of
corporate liability for human rights); id. at 142 (describing how one corporation, Unocal, learned the “hard
way” of the consequences of being a bad corporate citizen); id. at 167 (explaining that “good corporate
conduct” and “good corporate citizenship” mandate the recognition of human rights in business judgments).
204 See Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, supra note 183, at 4–5.
205 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368.
206 See Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, supra note 183, at 4–5.
207 But see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37 (discussing the corruption and human rights
violations that have occurred in Nigeria).
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Such a superficial analysis would miss the mark. As has been increasingly
demonstrated, government capacity to progressively realize economic and
social rights is directly linked to levels of corruption and broader dimensions
of good governance more generally.208 Thus, to fully assess whether
progressive realization is likely to take place with an increase in revenues, a
wide range of political and governance variables would need to be studied as
part of the assessment.209 This, in turn, would give project planners a much
more nuanced view of a project’s potential to impact economic and social
human rights, both positively and negatively.
As part of a human rights assessment that attempts to predict future
impacts, the Bank would also need to look at the government’s record with
respect to human rights. If a particular government has an egregious history
with respect to the rights of political dissidents, civil society critics, and the
management of revenues for health and education, for example, it seems
unlikely that increased oil wealth will reverse these tendencies. As has been
noted in the context of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project and elsewhere, oil
wealth tends to magnify existing patterns, not reduce them.210 Identification of
existing and past trends and patterns is therefore integral to predicting the
likelihood that a project will result in poverty alleviation or otherwise result in
detrimental human rights impacts.
In assessing human rights impacts though the steps outlined above, the
World Bank would, in effect, be indirectly assessing indicia of government
capacity and willingness to use project revenues to alleviate poverty.211 As
such, this type of assessment would provide the Bank with a more grounded
basis for evaluating a government’s professions of faith in the project and
provide policymakers with a more accurate sense of a government’s likely
“political commitment.”212
208 See id. at 2 (arguing that the local government in Rivers State, Nigeria, has violated its duty to
progressively realize rights to health and education though widespread and flagrant corruption and
mismanagement of oil revenues); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 39–40 (arguing that, due at least
in part to mismanagement and corruption, the government of Angola has impeded Angolans’ ability to enjoy
their economic, social, and cultural rights, including healthcare and education, in violation of the government’s
own commitments and human rights treaties to which it is a party).
209 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 4 (listing many variables in its recommendation to
the government of Angola).
210 Pegg, supra note 107, at 311–12.
211 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 6.
212 See Horta, supra note 180, at 228 (calling on the Bank to adopt a “rights-based approach to
development that pays close attention to the political environment of a country by examining who holds the
power and how it is exercised”).
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In the case of Chad, analysis of the likelihood that the government of Chad
would be able to “progressively realize” economic and social rights as a result
of increased revenues flowing from the project might have forced the Bank, at
a much earlier stage, to more openly confront issues of corruption, governance,
and capacity to manage oil revenues.213 This might have resulted in the
reconfiguration or re-sequencing of the project at a stage when the World Bank
had more leverage.214 It is also possible that such nuanced assessments may
well have revealed that the likelihood that economic and social rights would be
progressively realized was so low that the project was not worth doing, or at
least not worth subjecting the Bank’s credibility as political risk bearer and
moral guarantor to great risk.215 For example, it may be that a government’s
track record with respect to human rights issues is such that professions of
commitment to use oil revenues for the betterment of its people ring hollow.
The approach outlined above recalls the results of a major assessment
commissioned by the World Bank in 2001 to study the question of future
World Bank involvement in extractive industries projects.216 That study
concluded that involvement should include projects where Bank interventions
would contribute to poverty alleviation.217 The study further emphasized that
this can only happen when the right “enabling conditions” are in place,
including governance, social, and environmental policies, and respect for
human rights.218 Conducting human rights assessments, in addition to the
assessments which the Bank already conducts, would place the Bank in a better
position to evaluate whether those enabling conditions are in place.
B. Potential Objections
Several objections to mandating human rights assessments for international
financial institutions might be raised. First, assessments are costly and time
consuming, potentially delaying a project by several years.219 At the same
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Id. at 237.
FRANK & GUESNET, supra note 52, at 67.
215 See Horta, supra note 180, at 237.
216 See EXTRACTIVE INDUS. REVIEW, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE—THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW vii (2004) [hereinafter
EI REVIEW].
217 Id. at vii.
218 See id. at v.
219 See Bård Anders Andreassen & Hans-Otto Sano, What’s the Purpose? Observations on Human Rights
Impact Assessments 17 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/kc/
downloads/vl/docs/214054.pdf.
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time, given that the World Bank already conducts a battery of impact
assessments, including environmental and social impact assessments, some
measure of delay is already part of the program planning and assessment
process.220 Therefore, it seems unlikely that a human rights impact assessment
would delay things significantly further if conducted concurrently with other
assessments.221
Perhaps more seriously, there is a risk that to the extent that a project is
delayed on human rights grounds, it could negatively affect perceptions of
local human rights NGOs and human rights principles in general.222 In the
context of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, for example, early efforts by local
human rights advocates to delay the project in order for more capacity building
to be done were met with open public hostility.223 Given the endemic poverty
in Chad and the perception that the pipeline project would rapidly alleviate it,
many saw efforts by human rights activists to delay the project as holding them
hostage to a set of luxuries they could ill afford.224 In the end, the solution to
this problem might be greater awareness by both civil society and the World
Bank about the negative consequences of oil production seen in other
countries, and the need for an assessment to avoid these same pitfalls.
Another objection might be that, insofar as human rights assessments
examine civil and political rights issues and are used to analyze indirect indicia
of a government’s likely commitment to a project, the process will come to be
seen as “political,” potentially raising objections by policymakers at the World
Bank, to say nothing of the governments of the countries being assessed.225
However, while the accusation of playing politics can arise in any assessment
process, the advantage of human rights assessments is that they would be
grounded in obligations under international law.226 Thus, one might argue that
the advantage of approaching issues of government capacity and willingness to
use the revenues for poverty alleviation through the window of an assessment
of human rights impacts is that the evaluation of a government’s commitment
may come to look less like a partisan assessment and condemnation than a
legal and technocratic review of a government’s ability to fulfill its duties
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See Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, supra note 183, at 4–5.
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See Rosenblum, supra note 45, at 198–99.
Id.
Id.
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under international law.227 At the same time, it is possible that this approach
could also serve to illustrate how more comprehensive human rights analysis
and assessment makes pragmatic policy sense as a tool for predicting likely
success of a project, defined as serving to alleviate poverty.228 In so doing, this
might serve to ease the cultural divide between lawyers and economists within
the World Bank, to which some have attributed, at least in part, the current
impasse with respect to a more comprehensive human rights policy.229
CONCLUSION
The gap between the promises of the revenues of newly discovered natural
resources and the effects of those revenues in practice cannot but disappoint.
When facing conditions of dire poverty, it is tempting to make a high-stakes
gamble and try to beat the odds of the resource curse through any series of
legal and policy interventions possible under the circumstances. The Chadian
experience is an admittedly limited example, but as the world’s leading attempt
yet to beat the resource curse,230 it is instructive for the future projects that will
surely come. While it may be too early to say that legal and policy
interventions cannot serve to mitigate the resource curse, the Chadian
experience suggests that those interventions are unlikely to have a major
impact unless certain “enabling conditions” are present.231
The World Bank’s central aim of reducing poverty has little chance of
being advanced when it ignores a broader perspective on a country’s
conditions, including human rights conditions.232 While human rights
assessments cannot prevent the resource curse, they could better steer the
World Bank and other development institutions towards those extractive
projects where the chances of mitigating the resource curse are the highest, and
therefore where the chances of using the project to alleviate poverty are best.233
Far from being peripheral to the World Bank’s core mission, human rights
assessments would serve as a valuable tool in choosing and structuring projects
in ways that could increase the possibility of success. To be sure, assessments
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would take time, money, and if conducted rigorously and with integrity, would
mean that certain projects do not go forward with World Bank sanction or
support.234 In the long run, this can only result in focusing institutional
resources on those projects where the World Bank’s stated aim of poverty
alleviation is most realistic. While poverty alleviation in Chad has proved to be
a pipedream for now, careful attention to the notes of the requiem played in the
pipeline project’s wake could serve to ensure that future projects do not suffer
the same fate.
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See generally Legal Opinion from Roberty Danino, supra note 183.

